Thread by Leonid Volkov

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Russia against Putin.
A thread on what's going on with the public opinion of the Russian society.
(A lot. It changes rapidly, and definitely not in the way Putin would like it to change).
1/18
But before we start: where does the data come from and how could we expect it to be accurate?
There is a public opinion research department at the Anti-Corruption Foundation @ACF_int since 2013. It conducts phone polls, web-based surveys, focus groups etc.
2/18
As a political organisation, we need to have reliable data about public opinion in Russia, so we never stopped researching it. We do at least one monthly poll, a telephone survey with 1000 random, gender and age-balanced participants across Russia.
3/18
Since Putin has started the war against Ukraine on Feb 24th, 2022, polling in Russia has become more challenging than it ever was. People are scared. The response rate has dropped. Pollsters should expect respondents to give "socially acceptable" answers.
4/18
Thus we developed several techniques to tackle these problems. We never ask direct questions ("Do you support the war?") as it doesn't make any sense — one can't expect respondents to answer sincerely, as they are well aware about the liabilities a "wrong" answer might yield
5/18
We also allow them to skip sensitive questions: we believe it is better than forcing the respondent to lie.
Yet, of course, there has to be a huge systematic error in our surveys, as we talk only to those who don't hang up when a pollster calls them from an unknown number
6/18
But we do it every month. And the systematic error should be the same every month. So, while the absolute numbers have to be taken into account with an extreme caution, we still believe the trends we can see are reliable.
7/18
... as, for example, one can clearly see on the chart above. Over one month the amount of those who call Putin's war (a "special military operation" in Kremlin's Newspeak) a success has dropped from 23 to 14 points, while the opposite opinion gained 4 points.
8/18
What is probably even more important: the majority is not yet ready to call it a failure, they are trying to avoid the uncomfortable truth ("too early to judge", "not sure", "prefer not to answer"), but what does it actually mean?
9/18
Let me frame it this way. Kremlin's powerful propaganda machine works 24/7 to explain that the war is going successfully, according to Putin's wise plans. And they are clearly failing to sell this narrative. Only 1/7 of the respondents are still buying it!
10/18
Does it mean that the other 6/7 are now Putin's enemies? Supporters of @navalny? Of course not! But they are finally not ready to blindly buy whatever Kremlin is trying to sell them. They are ready to listen to other stories!
That's why it is so important to talk to them.
11/18
Why are Russians losing faith in Putin's propaganda narratives? The answer is obvious: mobilization made them aware of what's actually going on. It reached out to almost every family in the country. It shocked those who believed in Putin's "stability" for decades.
12/18
They've lost faith in Russian armed forces. In August, before the mobilisation, 35% assessed the quality of Russian army above average, and just 15% considered to be below average. In the November poll this ratio shifted to 20:28.
13/18
But who wants to join the army which is losing the war, which is ill-equipped and not combat ready? That's the reason why Putin has made many statements denying the second wave of mobilization to come soon (of course, he is lying).
14/18
Even among those who are not afraid to talk to pollsters (and there are reasons to believe this is a pro-Putin leaning audience) a clear minority is in favor of continuing the war now. And this minority is getting smaller every month.
15/18
Bottom line.
1. Putin's propaganda has reached the limit of its effectiveness.
2. It is enormously important to keep talking to Russians who are looking for alternative narratives.
3. Kremlin will face serious difficulties with the next wave of mobilization.
16/18
Every point of support that Putin's war loses translates into lower morale of the army,
into logistical complications of the mobilization,
into further military defeats of the aggressors,
into sooner end of the war,
into lives saved.
17/18
This makes the work of those who talk to millions of Russians telling them the truth so valuable. Makes me very proud of what the @ACF_int team does at @politica_media, of what @tvrain does and everyone else. This is an important contribution for Putin's soonest defeat.
18/18
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