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This is a great (and important) thread on Putin's speech today. But we can say a couple of these points even a bit more strongly than the thread does
On the nuclear escalation topic, Putin rhetorically writes off first use in the conflict. That's a good thing, and the thread comes up with a few theories why.
I think it misses the most important one tho. A quick thread on that.
I think it misses the most important one tho. A quick thread on that.
Since the war, Russia has been toying with the idea of escalation. Not through official channels, which were for the most part structured as defensive restatements, but through unofficial and state-aligned (rather than state-owned) media, where the rhetoric was off the charts
That continued pretty much consistently from the invasion through to October 10. When something really important happened: the Kerch bridge attack by Ukraine.
During that weekend, internal Russian discourse went, to put it gently, batshit crazy.
After the weekend, Putin responded with a massive conventional series of strikes across Ukraine, targeting infrastructure and cultural sites.
It was a large, but conventional response.
After the weekend, Putin responded with a massive conventional series of strikes across Ukraine, targeting infrastructure and cultural sites.
It was a large, but conventional response.
But here's the thing. The week that followed, Russian internal discourse pivoted *hard* away from discussions of nuclear escalation. It wasn't discussed publicly, and the Russian government went to a lot of work to exclude it as a plausible option
Previously belligerent private military groups stopped talking about it, or deferred to MOD, saying they were doing a good job. MFA's US ambassador excluded it in an interview with CNN. The UK ambassador excluded it in an interview with the BBC. They wrote to the UN excluding it.
Then Putin himself excluded it at a tech conference shortly afterwards.
A completely fair question then is *why* they excluded it. The answer is (primarily) about domestic control and projection of strength internally.
A completely fair question then is *why* they excluded it. The answer is (primarily) about domestic control and projection of strength internally.
Putin wasn't close to escalation. Remember: the IC has *never* seen any indication of practical planning in that domain in R, and R has never signaled through any of its official channels that first use was imminent. Only innuendo, and bellicose state-*aligned* rhetoric.
But that put him in a tricky spot in the wake of the Kerch attack. Here was a major attack on R interests by UA, and internal discourse got carried away.
Putin's response was large. Unaffordably large.
But it couldn't possibly match up to internal demands for escalation.
Putin's response was large. Unaffordably large.
But it couldn't possibly match up to internal demands for escalation.
That was a problem for Putin, because it made his response--even a massive conventional response targeting out into civilian infrastructure--look weak by comparison.
*That's* why they had to close down this rhetoric and box themselves in.
*That's* why they had to close down this rhetoric and box themselves in.
In other words, leaving it open as a plausible option reduced Putin's ability to project strength in response to Ukrainian attacks internally, because they were calling for options he was not close to resorting to
In any case, Putin thinks he has conventional options in the medium-term that he would exhaust prior to nuclear escalation.
The other part of the speech that's particularly important is this one: Putin is once again pushing the West to reconsider the costs of its support to Ukraine. In other words, encouraging them to eventually abandon it.
Both of those two form the pillars of the current medium-term Russian strategy:
1. A belief that Russia's current force reconstitution efforts will provide a force to rollback recent Ukrainian gains
2. A belief that Western allies will abandon Ukraine over the long-term
1. A belief that Russia's current force reconstitution efforts will provide a force to rollback recent Ukrainian gains
2. A belief that Western allies will abandon Ukraine over the long-term
If you want to read more about those, I write about them here👇, and why diplomatic efforts to obtain a ceasefire (as France and Germany, but even Gen Milley, are pushing for) is very unlikely in the short-term, and how to defeat that R strategy.
www.pwnallthethings.com/p/the-war-will-end-with-diplomacy-but
www.pwnallthethings.com/p/the-war-will-end-with-diplomacy-but
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