Thread
Could Russia use a nuclear weapon against Ukraine?
Yes. While the risk is still low, it's rising.
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Yes. While the risk is still low, it's rising.
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To start, "could" doesn't mean "will". I agree with @Nick_L_Miller that "very high risk" is an exaggeration.
What does "Russia using a nuclear weapon" actually mean?
It likely means using a "tactical" nuclear weapon on the battlefield (say, to stop Ukrainian forces pushing forward), rather than a "strategic" nuclear weapon (say, on Kyiv).
dornsife.usc.edu/news/stories/3765/what-are-tactical-nuclear-weapons/
It likely means using a "tactical" nuclear weapon on the battlefield (say, to stop Ukrainian forces pushing forward), rather than a "strategic" nuclear weapon (say, on Kyiv).
dornsife.usc.edu/news/stories/3765/what-are-tactical-nuclear-weapons/
To be clear, while tactical nuclear weapons are "small", they're use is still REALLY bad in terms of the death and destruction they can cause.
www.scientificamerican.com/article/limited-tactical-nuclear-weapons-would-be-catastrophic/
www.scientificamerican.com/article/limited-tactical-nuclear-weapons-would-be-catastrophic/
So why is the risk of Russia using a nuke rising?
Three big reasons:
1) Ukraine obsession
2) Territorial "defense"
3) Regime Survival
Let's unpack each.
Three big reasons:
1) Ukraine obsession
2) Territorial "defense"
3) Regime Survival
Let's unpack each.
First, Ukraine Obsession.
This is the idea that Russia -- read Putin -- will do ANYTHING to gain Ukrainian territory.
This is the idea that Russia -- read Putin -- will do ANYTHING to gain Ukrainian territory.
Nuclear weapons *typically* are not that useful in bargaining: threats to use them are not credible -- the cost of using them *typically* outweighs any possible benefit.
www.cambridge.org/core/journals/international-organization/article/abs/crisis-bargaining-and-nuclear-...
www.cambridge.org/core/journals/international-organization/article/abs/crisis-bargaining-and-nuclear-...
I write *typically* b/c Putin's behavior -- much of which seems destructive to Russia (to the Russian military, to the Russian people, to the Russian economy) -- suggests that he thinks of "costs" differently: he's bent of gaining Ukrainian territory.
www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/the-putin-puzzle-why-is-the-russian-dictator-so-obsessed-w...
www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/the-putin-puzzle-why-is-the-russian-dictator-so-obsessed-w...
Stated more formally, Putin has "extreme preferences", that makes his behavior especially concerning.
www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09636412.2019.1662482
www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09636412.2019.1662482
It's also worrying that Putin referred to USA use of the atomic bomb against Japan in 1945 as "setting a precedent". That seems to be establishing, at least in his mind, that using the bombs is acceptable behavior given the circumstances.
Important Note: the precedent isn't *just* using nuclear weapons; it's using them during a conventional war for the purpose of ending that conventional war (though the extent to which dropping the bombs on Japan accomplished that aim is still debated).
www.amazon.com/Racing-Enemy-Stalin-Truman-Surrender/dp/0674022416
www.amazon.com/Racing-Enemy-Stalin-Truman-Surrender/dp/0674022416
Second, Territorial "defense"
This is the idea that Russia will use a nuclear weapon to defend attacks on Russian territory.
This is the idea that Russia will use a nuclear weapon to defend attacks on Russian territory.
Russia made that policy clear from the beginning of the invasion.
www.reuters.com/world/europe/kremlin-russia-would-only-use-nuclear-weapons-if-its-existence-were-thre...
www.reuters.com/world/europe/kremlin-russia-would-only-use-nuclear-weapons-if-its-existence-were-thre...
Putin reiterated that policy on Friday
This is why the recent "Annexations" -- though totally illegal under international law -- matter: if Ukrainian forces now enter those provinces, Russia can interpret that as violating Russian territory, a "red line" for nuclear use.
The intent of using the nuclear weapon would be "escalating to de-escalate": i.e., the nuclear weapon would stop defeat, rather than win (because one would think that even Russian planners recognize that you can't "win" a nuclear war)
warontherocks.com/2018/02/nuclear-posture-review-russian-de-escalation-dangerous-solution-nonexistent...
warontherocks.com/2018/02/nuclear-posture-review-russian-de-escalation-dangerous-solution-nonexistent...
In other words, it's the idea that, as @bdtaylor_SU writes in this thread, "conventional weapons take, nuclear weapons hold".
Third, Regime Survival.
This relates to the idea that using nuclear weapons allows Putin to stay in power in Russia.
This relates to the idea that using nuclear weapons allows Putin to stay in power in Russia.
This is the idea of "Gambling for Resurrection", which Downs and Rocke described in their seminal paper.
www.jstor.org/stable/2111408
www.jstor.org/stable/2111408
The "gamble" is that while losing the war guarantees removal from office, staying in the war (or, in the case of Russia using nukes, taking an extreme, low probability of success action) holds out the chance of remaining in office. 
@hgoemans built on this idea in his book "War and Punishment"...
www.amazon.com/War-Punishment-Causes-Termination-First/dp/0691049440
www.amazon.com/War-Punishment-Causes-Termination-First/dp/0691049440
...and just discussed it in a recent @NewYorker interview
www.newyorker.com/culture/annals-of-inquiry/how-the-war-in-ukraine-might-end
www.newyorker.com/culture/annals-of-inquiry/how-the-war-in-ukraine-might-end
One mechanism by which this could work (i.e. help Putin save face domestically) is by provoking the US/NATO into retaliating, allowing Putin to say that he lost to "The West" not Ukraine.
Not everyone agrees with this idea, arguing that it could backfire on Putin.
Those are the three reasons Putin could use a nuclear weapon.
Are there reasons to think that Putin won't use nuclear weapons?
Yes.
Are there reasons to think that Putin won't use nuclear weapons?
Yes.
The annexation and the above statements about the use of nuclear weapons could just be posturing or "brinksmanship": Putin is doing/saying risky things for the sake of making The West THINK that he could do something crazy like use a nuclear weapon.
foreignpolicy.com/2022/09/26/crazy-logic-brinksmanship-putin-russia-ukraine-united-states/
foreignpolicy.com/2022/09/26/crazy-logic-brinksmanship-putin-russia-ukraine-united-states/
This is where the Nordstream pipe line explosion this week becomes relevant. Some think that if Russia did it (which is VERY LIKELY) it was the equivalent of "throwing out the steering wheel": i.e. a demonstration that you're willing to do crazy things!
Critically though, it is a relatively "safe" demonstration.
Yes, the brinksmanship explanation requires a lot of "I think that you think that I think that you think..." logic. But that doesn't mean it's wrong.
If Putin does use a nuclear weapon, it could have profound and far reaching implications. Those are for another 🧵, but a BIG one is breaking the "nuclear taboo"
In sum, Ukraine obsession, Territorial defense (of the annexed regions), and regime survival point to the risk of nuclear weapons use being real, even if still low.
Given Putin's words and decisions to this point in the war, no possibility can be taken off the table.
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Given Putin's words and decisions to this point in the war, no possibility can be taken off the table.
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Addendum: @Cirincione offers an extremely useful 🧵 of sources (tied to his recent @washingtonpost piece) that elaborate on Russia's nuclear doctrine & on the possible US/NATO response to a Russian nuclear strike.
