Thread
A thread on recent conversations with experts and officials about Putin:
— At the war’s start there was a debate whether he was “mad” or making “mad” decisions based off “mad” informations that a “mad” system was feeding him.
— Western officials now comfortable it’s the second.
— At the war’s start there was a debate whether he was “mad” or making “mad” decisions based off “mad” informations that a “mad” system was feeding him.
— Western officials now comfortable it’s the second.
— Western officials feel the decision to re-focus the war and tactically redeploy away from Kyiv and northern fronts show Putin is still making rational decisions.
— Western officials do no see him as in an emotional fugue ordering non-existent units onwards to capture cities.
— Western officials do no see him as in an emotional fugue ordering non-existent units onwards to capture cities.
— Western officials feel that Putin is still not receiving a full picture of events on the ground.
— Western officials think he still thinks he can “win” a victory on the Donbas front and expand the so-called republics territories.
— Western officials think he still thinks he can “win” a victory on the Donbas front and expand the so-called republics territories.
— However key to remember Western and Ukraine security sources are trying to destabilise Putin by putting out he doesn’t understand the battlefield and is being lied to by his underlings. This is strategy not analysis.
— Now Israeli officials say Putin’s war aims are changing.
— Now Israeli officials say Putin’s war aims are changing.
— The operating assumption is that Putin wants to take the rest of the Donbas, destroy the Ukrainian army there (1/4 of the total) and then push to settle either for a deal or a ceasefire.
— Speculation about a wanting it over by May 9th World War Two Victory day celebrations.
— Speculation about a wanting it over by May 9th World War Two Victory day celebrations.
— It is not perceived that the war has seriously changed Putin’s isolation, covid rules and fear factor creating a bubble around him.
— A hint from a Russian report about his medical condition: close contact with a doctor specialist in thyroid cancer.
— A hint from a Russian report about his medical condition: close contact with a doctor specialist in thyroid cancer.
— The assumption is the botched war has confirmed and accelerated the profoundly anti-Western conservative nationalist drift Putin has been in over recent years that lead to it.
— The assumption is Putin’s future trajectory will reflect this.
— The assumption is Putin’s future trajectory will reflect this.
— Looking ahead officials and experts are not confident but there is a sense we are seeing the “limits” of what Putin is ready to throw into the war.
— There is a a shaky sense (50%) is he will stick to pledges about non use of conscripts and not issue a general mobilisation.
— There is a a shaky sense (50%) is he will stick to pledges about non use of conscripts and not issue a general mobilisation.
— Without a general mobilisation Russia is seen as simply not having the troops to achieve any more than the new more limited assumed goals in the Donbas.
— Meanwhile, in Moscow Putin’s personal regime has hampered the war effort.
— First in the planning, in which it was cooked up near conspiratorially as a “special operation” by him and his associates without a real military and inter-agency process.
— First in the planning, in which it was cooked up near conspiratorially as a “special operation” by him and his associates without a real military and inter-agency process.
— Second the expectations. The ludicrous belief Ukraine would collapse and a puppet-regime be installed reflected the ideological micro-climate of Putin’s court and not a serious intelligence estimate. The fear factor meant he was told what he wanted to hear.
— Third on the battlefield. The lack of a supreme theatre commander and the way orders are being dispatched from Moscow means generals in the field are not autonomous enough and are struggling with decisions.
— Today there is a sense that not only is Putin more isolated than Stalin from the Russian elite, he is also making worse mistakes than Stalin during the early Second World War, through maintaining greater control over field commanders than he did.
— The Putin factor is now undermining the “peace talks.”
— There is a sense that Russian negotiators and diplomats do not know what Putin wants.
— This is creating an atmosphere of confusion, paranoia an uncertainty forwarding figures.
— There is a sense that Russian negotiators and diplomats do not know what Putin wants.
— This is creating an atmosphere of confusion, paranoia an uncertainty forwarding figures.
— There are at first glance contradictory reports on how the Russian elite is responding to the sanctions and war.
— First reports of a despairing tendency and a sense their old world has been destroyed.
— Second reports since they are all sanctioned they are rallying to him.
— First reports of a despairing tendency and a sense their old world has been destroyed.
— Second reports since they are all sanctioned they are rallying to him.
— However for Russian elite figures emotions of despair, private anger and a sense of needing to rally to Putin can all be felt at the same time.
— The perception of experts and Western officials is that talk of coups and cracks ate vastly over exaggerated and Twitter.
— The perception of experts and Western officials is that talk of coups and cracks ate vastly over exaggerated and Twitter.
— The perception of Western officials and Russian observers is that the critical security institutions in Moscow remain loyal and committed to war.
— Strange viral internet stories are seen as seen as a online versions of battlefield rumours either spread or self-generating.
— Strange viral internet stories are seen as seen as a online versions of battlefield rumours either spread or self-generating.
— Reports from Moscow suggest that for now Putin is simply ignoring the few economic liberals who are warning him of the sanctions disaster and need to stop the war. The perception is that he is still listening to military and intelligence figure saying Donbas can be salvaged.
— The collapse of the liberal Russian upper middle class, with mass flight to exile of both normal people and cultural icons, is understood by Western diplomats as framing how Kremlin elites view the domestic situation. There is no heightened fear of 2011 style protests again.
— However despite all this the Russian elite has some discernible cracks and audible tensions in it, such as what Kadyrov or Deripaska are saying.
— Having been held together easily by Putin in the economic and strategic good times it has not been stress tested in the bad times.
— Having been held together easily by Putin in the economic and strategic good times it has not been stress tested in the bad times.
— The near-universal base case however is Putin controlling a more fractious regime together for at least the medium term.
— However officials and experts all keen to say they have built an assumption they don’t understand the Kremlin: it could be very unpredictable indeed.
— However officials and experts all keen to say they have built an assumption they don’t understand the Kremlin: it could be very unpredictable indeed.
— Finally the frustrating truth for officials and experts is that Putin remains distant, confusing and hard to gauge as an object of international relations and policy must be crafted accordingly.
