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Japan Prepares for Total War: The Search for Economic Security, 1919–1941

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The roots of Japan's aggressive, expansionist foreign policy have often been traced to its concern over acute economic vulnerability. Michael A. Barnhart tests this assumption by examining the events leading up to World War II in the context of Japan's quest for economic security, drawing on a wide array of Japanese and American sources.

Barnhart focuses on the critical years from 1938 to 1941 as he investigates the development of Japan's drive for national economic self-sufficiency and independence and the way in which this drive shaped its internal and external policies. He also explores American economic pressure on Tokyo and assesses its impact on Japan's foreign policy and domestic economy. He concludes that Japan's internal political dynamics, especially the bitter rivalry between its army and navy, played a far greater role in propelling the nation into war with the United States than did its economic condition or even pressure from Washington. Japan Prepares for Total War sheds new light on prewar Japan and confirms the opinions of those in Washington who advocated economic pressure against Japan.

262 pages, Kindle Edition

First published January 1, 1987

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Michael A. Barnhart

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Displaying 1 - 9 of 9 reviews
Profile Image for Chin Joo.
88 reviews30 followers
April 14, 2017
This is a book that explores why Japan went to war in China in the 1930s and got herself entangled in a war with the British, Dutch, and most of all, the Americans, guaranteeing their own eventual destruction. The story takes the reader back to the end of the First World War when the the military learned two lessons from Germany's defeat:

1. The army should avoid politics so that politics would not interfere with the army.

2. Japan needs to find a way to keep herself economically self-sufficient or risk an inevitably decline given the rapid grow in her population.

Ironically, the former, instead of keeping politics out of the army, the army came to dominate politics so much so that the political system in Japan almost ceased to exist by the late 1930s. And in the case of the latter, the quest to avoid decline would eventually lead to her near-annihilation.

Japan's story in the 1920s and 30s is quite an amazing one. Today, depending on how they see that period of their history, people are still arguing whether Japan waged a war or aggression or self-preservation. Japan was facing a population explosion at that time, they needed land to emigrate their people to and they needed resources which Japan scarcely had. Couple this with her recent victory over both China (1894/5) and Russia (1905), not only did the opportunity presented itself in the shape of Manchuria, it also gave the army the confidence to pursue what they deemed the politicians were not capable of. When the early policies of bribery and working with the regional warlord (in this case Zhang Zhuolin) did not work out, the Japanese murdered him, driving his son to eventually align the Northeastern provinces with the central government of Chiang Kaishek. That developed into the Manchurian Incident giving the Japanese the opportunity to occupy the provinces which later unexpectedly led to the Marco Polo Bridge Incident. One thing led to another, and in no time the Americans were openly showing displeasure with the Japanese.

This book looks at the events from both the Japanese and American perspectives. It was like a movie jumping from scene to scene, alternating between what the Japanese were contemplating and how the Americans were responding. If one wants to know how politicians in the US engage in discussions, arguments and decision-making, this book has it all. Many people are familiar with the doctrine of "graduated escalation" McNamara introduced in the lead up to the Vietnam War. It is not that different in the Second World War; the Americans would respond to a Japanese escalation, who in turn would take some measures in the belief that the Americans were go to suffocate them. The Americans, on seeing the Japanese not backing down, would consider them belligerent and take more severe measures, in the end, Pearl Habor was quite inevitable, and so would the Japanese's surrender.

This very detailed book is full of important information and would be of immense interest to the enthusiast who wants to know the longer story of Japan's step-by-step journey to war with the Americans. In a sense this is more complete than an earlier book that I read, Japan 1941: Countdown to Infamy  by Eri Hotta. However, this one is much harder to reader compared to Hotta's book which was written in a more story-telling style. Still, a reader who makes it through the book will be rewarded with a good understanding of the unfortunate circumstances that drew both the Japanese and Americans into the final showdown.
Profile Image for Stoyan Stoyanov.
48 reviews6 followers
November 21, 2016
This is an extremely important book for any student of the Pacific War and Japanese-American relations leading to it.

The major contribution of Barnhart is to have very carefully waded through a true maze of archives on both sides of the Pacific. This is especially valuable with respect to Japan. Barnhart reveals how Japan's policy makers sought to make Japan self-sufficient in resources and materials so it would be able to win a protracted (future) war. Japan's predicament in being resource-poor and the lessons it drew from observing Germany's defeat in World War I, appeared to call for remedying this problem by expanding production capacity and acquiring resources, especially in Manchuria. Eventually, conflict withing Japan's military (army vs navy) as well as an ongoing and expanding war in China, subverted and ultimately upended these goals. In pursuing self-sufficiency, Japan became less and less self-sufficient in the course of the 1930s, imposing increasingly painful restrictions on civilian consumption, while never really resolving the constant fight for supremacy between army and navy in allocation of scarce and diminishing resources. Japan's increasing belligerence during the 1930s was a product of that inter-service rivalry as well as a siege mentality that never really allowed for questioning of basic assumptions and re-examination of priorities.

With respect to policy in the US, Barnhart demonstrates a remarkable (and regrettable) lack of clarity in policy objectives. Different groups of officials within the State Department (esp. Cordell Hull and Stanley Hornbeck), within Treasury (Morgenthau) as well as FDR himself, did not clearly articulate objectives to US policy with respect to Japan. While WW II unfolded in Europe, it seems that the only consensus within the US government was a distaste and a repudiation for Japan's behavior in East Asia, and especially in China. But there was never an attempt to foresee Japan's ultimate goals, never a serious effort to clarify American goals with respect to Japan. For a while, there was hope that economic problems would discourage Japan from further aggression. When that did not happen, many steps were taken that seemed to send contradictory signals to the Japanese government. On one hand, FDR determined to keep MOST of the Pacific Fleet at Hawaii (as opposed to sending a substantial part of it to the Atlantic), perhaps in the hope that its mere presence would serve as a deterrent to further Japanese aggression. On the other hand, for most of the 1930s the US continued to supply Japan with oil and other vital materials which were immediately applied in the ongoing Japanese war in China -- as if the US did not really mind what Japan was doing there. The US continued to act in the misguided hope that a civilian (and peaceful) group of Japanese politicians, temporarily evicted from power, were about to come back and introduce dramatic, peaceful changes to Japanese policies.

Ultimately, Barnhart's greatest achievement here is to highlight the fundamental misunderstanding that persisted between Japan and the United States for most of the 1930s. Japan, continually seeing in the US a model for itself, but also a dangerous rival in the Far East. Japan, moreover, which continually misread American policies -- seeing support in continued trade relations, or outright hostility in American demands to evacuate China. America, on the other hand, appears as lacking well-considered policy objectives. Both Joseph Grew, American Ambassador to Tokyo, and a group within the State Department, continued to hold out hope that a pacifist political elite was just below the surface of Japanese politics and that America's objective was to not make its return to power more difficult. Americans at a fundamental level did not have an understanding about the rivalry between Army and Navy in Japan. And, American policy makers never managed to perceive how different policies affected Japanese perceptions or Japanese intentions.

Barnhart offers a rather pessimistic view. He argues that the conflict between Japan and the United States was virtually impossible to prevent once certain conditions obtained. Certainly, after 1937, and especially after the German attack on the Soviet Union, he believes the Pacific War could not have been prevented. This is both because Japan and the United States held very different visions about the future of East Asia, and also because there were fundamental flaws in how the two sides viewed each other and (mis)interepreted each other's actions. This study is, indeed, an eye-opener with respect to how nations approach their vital interests and how an inability to understand the other side leads directly to missteps, and, ultimately, war. Very highly recommended.
79 reviews16 followers
August 2, 2023
A classic account of Japan's long road to Pearl Harbor. Barnhart starts his story at the end of World War I. In the wake of WWI, Japan saw that future wars were likely to be lengthy and feature economic sanctions. Japan, as a resource scarce nation, thus embarked on a path to economic autarky in preparation for the next war. The road to autarky is what ultimately embroils Japan in its war against the US.
Profile Image for Mike Harbert.
71 reviews3 followers
May 27, 2014
Michael Barnhart presents an in depth study of Japan's rise to power and quest for self-sufficiency in the decade leading up to the first years of World War II. That being said, this is not a breezy, easy to read book. I found the prose a little dense and had to re-read several passages to fully comprehend what the author was trying to say. While I have studied World War II, and particularly the Pacific war, extensively I have not established as thorough an understanding of pre-war Japan as I probably should have before attempting Barnhart's book (I do have a much better understanding now as a result).

I would say that this is not a book for the casual reader of history, but instead is better suited for the serious student who seeks to better understand what brought Japan to embark on their ruinous campaign to conquer their I tended empire in the Pacific, SE Asia, and China. This is an extensively well researched book and will no doubt serve as a valuable reference. Just be forewarned, this is not a casual read.
Profile Image for Tacitus.
342 reviews
March 2, 2020
Barnhart did deep research into the archives on both sides of the Pacific, weaving them together to create a narrative of the economic and diplomatic decisions that led to the Pacific War.

In brief, Japan’s government was dominated by militarists, who grew in power in the years before the war. They were striving to achieve economic self-sufficiency, primarily to maintain the war in China and, at the same time, gird for the next world war. That war they saw as a war with the Soviet Union; ironically, given its importance to his narrative, Barnhart doesn’t discuss the Soviet-Japanese neutrality pact that was signed in the same time frame.

The Japanese military embraced what seem to be a series of paradoxes. The army wanted to clinch the war in China while preparing for a war with the USSR. The navy seemed to understand that a war with the USA would be disastrous, but prepared for it anyway. Each service became a slave to its own institutional imperatives; in other words, the army sought a war and the resources to justify its existence, and the navy did the same.

Recall that the navy and army were essentially co-equal partners with the civilian “branch” at this time, and through assassinations and appointments, the military began to dominate the civilian government by 1941. Both army and navy bargained for the economic resources to strengthen themselves for the wars each wanted to fight. Each was able to bargain with the other and get what it wanted, and Japanese security policy seems like a bewildering series of short-term compromises that often involved (by Barnhart’s description) shouting matches. Meanwhile, the civilian economy suffered in this internal policy war, as the army and navy took bigger and bigger slices of the economic pie.

Throughout, the policies of both Japan and the USA seemed incoherent and contradictory. For example, it was never clear what the Roosevelt administration wanted Japan to do. It constantly demanded that Japan withdraw from China, because the USA wanted a return to the Open Door policy. In any case, Japan would never agree to this, and wanted recognition of Manchukuo; both sides could never get past this essential sticking point. As Barnhart concludes, the USA and Japan had fundamentally opposing views of the next economic order in Asia. How such contrasting visions can lead to war is one of the lasting contributions of this book, and still timely and thought-provoking in 2020.

Reacting to the Japanese seizure of French Indochina, the Roosevelt administration seemed to think it could restrain Japan from further aggression by imposing an asset freeze, which became an oil embargo. In this, the USA was caught in a paradox of its own: the very embargo that it thought would restrain Japan actually provoked Japan to eventually go to war. Japan’s main goal in the southern strategy was to seize the Dutch East Indies, and while doing so, ensuring economic security by kicking the Anglo-Americans out of the region.

While he spends little to no time on pre-war military strategy, as his focus is on diplomacy and trade, Barnhart does an especially good job at explaining the influence of the ongoing war in Europe on decision making. In this regard, Japan worried about getting supplies from Europe; with the German invasion of the USSR, Japanese supplies from Europe delivered by the Trans-Siberian railroad were cut off. The Japanese tried to negotiate with the government in Dutch East Indies for more oil, but they were for the most part rebuffed. In this way, Barnhart contextualizes the 1940-1941 period well, and connects Japan’s thinking in particular to the wider global war.

Barnhart also touches on the role of US code-breaking (MAGIC). The irony is that while the Americans were reading Japanese diplomatic codes, the Americans thought that they were getting the truth and the whole picture. In fact, as Barnhart points out, much of Japanese foreign policy was riven by the army-navy rivalry, which remained in the background and so unrevealed in MAGIC. It’s hard to know how this would have played into American thinking if they had known of it, but the point remains: the Americans thought they knew everything thanks to MAGIC, but actually didn’t.

While clearly well researched, with a clear command of the Japanese language and thoughtful explanatory footnotes throughout, Barnhart lacks that poet’s touch that could have made this history transcendent. I never got a feel for any of the central players, who served such contrasts: Konoe, Tojo, Grew, Stimson, Morgenthau, Roosevelt--to name a few. I think some of this would have helped no only enliven the narrative, but also quite possibly help explain it. As it stands, Barnhart focuses on the decisions without much of a human backdrop.

In any case, Barnhart effectively explains the processes that led to the Pacific War. It’s hard to know if it was avoidable, as both sides were operating under their own perceptions—tragically, without much true understanding or empathy toward the other side. Americans, then and now, living in a country rich in its own resources, may not have understood the Japanese perspective; I know I didn’t until reading this. It’s clear to me now that the Japanese felt that American decisions to restrict its resources left them no choice but to go to war. As the Japanese saw it, these American moves put the very survival of the lifeblood of their nation--the army and navy--at risk. Once seen in this way, the Pacific War becomes somewhat more understandable, if no less tragic--maybe even more so.
Profile Image for Woocool.
16 reviews3 followers
November 25, 2020
A rather vivid and interesting illustration of pre-war Japan's strive for its economic autarky and its interaction with the States. Pursuing economic autarky is by no means wrong as any country's core policy, but if that entails a war, especially in the case of Japan who is extremely vulnerable in critical material supplies, and the war is against US who is its major supplier, that kind of a policy then need really careful revision. Japan failed to do that.

Another interesting point is that, Japan seems incapable of coping with its own controversies within itself. The army, navy, cabinet and the diet, everything mixed and tangled together, gradually, their goal and baseline got lost, and the result is whatever they dit not intend to see at the beginning.

Last, we shall never let the claim of self-sufficiency or national defense to be used as a cause, so that military acts over civil administrations. If we fail to do that, war ensues.

This book itself is a very interesting book to read. It has detailed data from various sources and these are smartly organized and presented. This book may not bring a breakthrough in the sphere of academic and research, but it is still a very book for people who is interesting in pre-war Japan.
Profile Image for Balkaran.
55 reviews10 followers
December 17, 2020
A bit of a cheat book tbh.
Don't look at me like that, gotta hit the 100 book goal somehow.

The Japanese modernisation is of particular interest to me as a powerful counterargument to the "colonialism brought technology to 3rd world country" crowd.
Furthermore, their destruction of the daimyo class and their reformation of the samurai class is also an interesting topic to study. This book rounds up the trials and tribulations of the blood thirsty east Asian powerhouse as they prepared to show that they too could measure up to the west.
94 reviews6 followers
November 11, 2019
"The result eventually was war--a war that neither nation desire, but one that nation could avoid."
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