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The People Next Door: The Curious History of India's Relations with Pakistan
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360 pages, Paperback
Published July 2, 2018
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Displaying 1 - 19 of 19 reviews
February 27, 2018
Before starting, thought it would be more personal. Instead it was a formal history of India-Pak relations. Nonetheless a good read as I was not aware of the facts.
May 6, 2018
In this eminently readable book Raghavan (a career diplomat and India’s former High Commissioner to Pakistan), gives a ring side view of the history of the tangled relations between the two countries.
As is made clear by the author in the introduction itself, this is a ‘history’ and not a ‘policy’ book. Hence it recounts the various phases of the relationship chronologically and brings out the roles played by various actors, specially the political and diplomatic establishments of the time. It does not make suggestions or give prescriptions.
As one reads through one is struck by the cyclical pattern of events. Most political heads on either side, in the initial part of their respective tenures in office, have tried to work on improving the relationship while being handcuffed by historical baggage, mutual mistrust and of course public opinions. Sooner or later setbacks like wars, events and incidents take place which force a stoppage or a course reversal. But after things settle down the thread is again picked up and another diplomatic dialogue reinitiated in the modified circumstances. The see saw battles and discussions continue. Giving up has never been a long term option for either country.
Raghavan does justice to the word ‘curious’ in the sub-title, by drawing out the unusual nature of this history.
For instance did you know that Kutch Tribunal Agreement in 1956 was signed for India by Azim Husain, secretary MEA with his brother-in-law and cousin Mian Arshad Hussain signing on behalf of Pakistan. Incidentally Azim Hussain had gone against the trend of migration at the time of partition and moved from West Punjab to India despite being a Muslim leaving his family behind.
Another unique aspect of this relationship has been the use of cricketing ties as not only a barometer of the prevailing sentiments but also as a diplomatic tool used to influence progress.
While obviously this is an account from the Indian side the narrative is very balanced and bereft of any jingoistic assertions. I guess diplomats don’t shout slogans.
Highly recommended.
As is made clear by the author in the introduction itself, this is a ‘history’ and not a ‘policy’ book. Hence it recounts the various phases of the relationship chronologically and brings out the roles played by various actors, specially the political and diplomatic establishments of the time. It does not make suggestions or give prescriptions.
As one reads through one is struck by the cyclical pattern of events. Most political heads on either side, in the initial part of their respective tenures in office, have tried to work on improving the relationship while being handcuffed by historical baggage, mutual mistrust and of course public opinions. Sooner or later setbacks like wars, events and incidents take place which force a stoppage or a course reversal. But after things settle down the thread is again picked up and another diplomatic dialogue reinitiated in the modified circumstances. The see saw battles and discussions continue. Giving up has never been a long term option for either country.
Raghavan does justice to the word ‘curious’ in the sub-title, by drawing out the unusual nature of this history.
For instance did you know that Kutch Tribunal Agreement in 1956 was signed for India by Azim Husain, secretary MEA with his brother-in-law and cousin Mian Arshad Hussain signing on behalf of Pakistan. Incidentally Azim Hussain had gone against the trend of migration at the time of partition and moved from West Punjab to India despite being a Muslim leaving his family behind.
Another unique aspect of this relationship has been the use of cricketing ties as not only a barometer of the prevailing sentiments but also as a diplomatic tool used to influence progress.
While obviously this is an account from the Indian side the narrative is very balanced and bereft of any jingoistic assertions. I guess diplomats don’t shout slogans.
Highly recommended.
December 26, 2017
Clear narrative and analysis of the events post partition.
Facts along with their logical as well as interpretative analysis since partition uptill 2015 have been narrated in a very clear and lucid manner. Most importantly it sheds a great deal of light on the Pakistani psyche as to why it thinks what it thinks about India.
Facts along with their logical as well as interpretative analysis since partition uptill 2015 have been narrated in a very clear and lucid manner. Most importantly it sheds a great deal of light on the Pakistani psyche as to why it thinks what it thinks about India.
June 29, 2024
‘The Adventure of Silver Blaze’ is a very famous and thrilling Sherlock Holmes story for the insights the detective infers from the scene of a crime. There is a passage in it that goes like this:
Gregory (Scotland Yard detective): "Is there any other point to which you would wish to draw my attention?"
Holmes: "To the curious incident of the dog in the night-time."
Gregory: "The dog did nothing in the night-time."
Holmes: "That was the curious incident."
The story involves deceit, avarice, crime and punishment. Likewise, India-Pakistan relations also involve most of these attributes and the curious incident is that bilateral relations have not improved a bit in spite of laborious measures undertaken by both sides. As far as India is concerned, Pakistan was always a pain on the western frontier. The nations had fought two large-scale and two small-scale wars over the issue of disputed territory. After realizing the futility of its desire to humble India on the battlefield, Pakistan turned to sponsoring terrorism as state policy to ‘bleed India through a thousand cuts’. The one thing that stands out from this exercise is India’s surprising resilience which always stood one step ahead of its troublesome neighbour. This book is a nice recap of India-Pakistan relations written with the authority of knowledge and experience. T C A Raghavan is a former Indian envoy to Pakistan. He also served in the Pakistan desk in India’s external affairs ministry and as director in the office of India’s foreign minister. Even though no personal anecdotes are mentioned in the book, the author has encapsulated the entire gamut of the relations between the two countries and presented his deductions with a commendable sense of justice and richness with every nuance carefully inserted at the right moment. The typical behaviour of the so called liberal intellectuals in India is to regret the partition that had occurred in 1947 and their wistful longing for Pakistan to come back to India and undo the partition. A useful takeaway from the book is the warning about the irritation such a desire would evoke in Pakistanis. Raghavan enunciates the point that Partition cannot be undone and what is doable is peaceful coexistence at least as non-meddling neighbours if not as friends.
The book narrates several incidents of India-Pakistan relations that vitiated the atmosphere but still are not widely known. Pakistan continues to harbour persons who are fugitives from Indian law such as Dawood Ibrahim, Hafiz Sayeed and Masood Azhar. This one fact amply demonstrates its enmity and hatred to India’s wellbeing. In fact, this is nothing new and was followed right from its existence. The peculiar episode of Bhupat daku is a case in point. Bhupat was a Hindu dacoit from Junagadh in Gujarat who was wanted in the context of 82 murders and several robberies. He escaped to Pakistan to evade Indian law. He was detained there for a year for illegal entry and thereafter it refused to deport him to stand trial for his crimes in India. This was sheer spite as Pakistan had no claim on him. Bhupat then converted to Islam and posed as a freedom fighter from Junagadh who opposed India’s takeover of that state in 1947. Pakistan never extradited him and he died in 2006. This policy is continued in the case of others too. However, with the recently rising trend of ‘unidentified gunmen’ disposing summary justice to some people wanted by India, the continued efficacy of this policy is in doubt.
Even though Afghanistan plays only a marginal role in India-Pakistan strategic reviews, its potential to seriously influence the regional balance is mentioned in the book. This perspective is very rarely seen in books of this genre. The British had unilaterally imposed the Durand Line of border demarcation between undivided India and Afghanistan thereby separating the Pashtun homeland into two. When the British left, the Pashtuns wanted to reunite with Afghanistan but there was no provision to revisit the frontiers on the northwest of Pakistan. Consequently, Afghanistan was the sole member state opposing Pakistan’s entry to the United Nations. Then came the invasion of Kashmir by Pakistani irregular troops in 1947. The UN ordered a ceasefire to which Pakistan proposed a conditional offer. They claimed the invasion to be on security grounds which included preventing India establishing a link for the movement of Pathanistan and to preclude the possibility of a pincer attack by India and Afghanistan. The Soviet occupation beginning in 1979 and the post-Taliban regime were eras in which Pakistan experienced a hostile neighbour on both the east and the west.
The people had to make a hard choice at the time of Partition in the provinces which were bifurcated. Hindus and Sikhs chose India while the Muslims selected Pakistan. The book lists out some Muslims who opted for India even though their native places were within Pakistan and their subsequent actions as it reflected on the relationship between the two countries. Most of these Muslims occupied high positions of power in the bureaucracy. Badruddin Tyabji was one of them working as secretary in the external affairs ministry. He advised Nehru to consider Pakistan as his ‘constituency’ in which he has to get elected. He also suggested treating the government of Pakistan as the opposition and that his reactions to Pakistan should be entirely those of one who was standing for election from there (p.50). In other words, this man was advising Nehru to offer maximum concessions to Pakistan! Nehru fully accepted the counsel was proved by his gifting of 80 per cent of the Indus waters in a treaty also co-signed by the World Bank. A very useful book on the Indus Waters Treaty named 'Indus Divided: India, Pakistan and the River Basin Dispute’ by Daniel Haines was reviewed earlier here. Nehru also agreed to conduct a plebiscite in Kashmir but barely wriggled out of the deal citing US-Pakistan military alliance concluded in the meanwhile. Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, India’s first education minister, asked Afzal Iqbal, a Pakistani diplomat, regarding the military treaty: “Why did you do this? Kashmir was falling on your lap like a ripe fruit” (p.52). The Urdu poetry in India was also a fit case of doubtful loyalty. The author narrates some differences in mutual perception taking the case of Urdu poetry in the aftermath of the 1965 war. Indian Urdu poets deliberately introduced a line of separation between the people and rulers of Pakistan with the implied suggestion that the Pakistani society is not to blame even though the country was at war with India. This demarcation was purely fictional. On the other hand, the Pakistani Urdu poets had no hesitation at all in branding the whole of India – people and rulers alike – as enemy and called for a jihad. Ali Sardar Jafri extolled the Pakistani poet Faiz Ahmed Faiz and argued that Indian poets should have friendship and sympathy for the people of Pakistan. This was when Faiz was actively supporting the Pakistani war machine and vigorously participating in war mushairas (p.92).
Raghavan includes a pointed analysis of the history of mutual dialog between the two neighbours. Nehru was damagingly generous (as far as India is concerned) but Indira Gandhi was curt most of the time, giving Pakistan no quarter. Pakistan was summarily defeated and split apart doing her tenure as prime minister in 1971. But the Janata party regime that followed (1977-79) was not firm enough with Pakistan. The 1971 victory had changed the Pakistani perspective on India’s fighting spirit. Disparaging rebukes like one Pakistani Muslim is equivalent to ten Hindus in the battlefield had given way to cold and rational estimates of military potential of both countries. Mani Sankar Aiyer, who was the Consul General in Karachi during this time, says that as compared to 1971, the prospect of a conflict with India generated not excitement and conviction of victory but fear and apprehension at the certainty of defeat. This, coupled with the change of guard in Pakistan in the form of General Zia ul Haq, ensured friendly terms for the Janata government. As the painful memory of Bangladesh gradually receded to the background, Pakistan again turned belligerent. Unusually meek overtures from India elicited only contemptuous response from the other side of the border. In June 1996 when Prime Minister Deve Gowda and foreign minister Gujral wrote to their counterparts seeking resumption of foreign secretary-level talks, not even a reply was received. The Gujral doctrine postulated India making unilateral and non-reciprocal concessions to its neighbours (p.221). A B Vajpayee at first stole the show with the explosion of nuclear devices, but then yielded to Pakistan even in the face of growing terrorist attacks in the country and hijacking of a commercial airliner. The secret incursion in Kargil fully exposed Pakistani duplicity. It also illustrated the futility of waiting for international diplomatic pressure to mount on Pakistan for effecting a withdrawal of its troops from Kargil. It was the might of the Indian army and its weaponry that drove Pakistani invaders scurrying to their lair. This was also a classic instance of Pakistan misjudging Indian will and ability to fight back. Of course, the author strictly maintains a tone of balance and an air of equanimity in the narrative exercising special care not to exhibit partisanship, but the message readers get is what is mentioned above.
The book shows a peculiar trait of early Indian envoys to Pakistan as of being under the illusion that partition was a temporary affair and they were working in a region not different from their homeland. Their familiarity with Pakistani officials and a shared common language of Urdu was instrumental in creating a superficial and illusive bonhomie. India’s envoy Kewal Singh attended the wedding of Pakistan foreign minister’s son in Rawalpindi while the 1965 war was raging in Kashmir. The reception was hostile, but he still found some excuse to praise the ‘grace and courtesy’ of some who behaved politely with him. Besides, he had gifted a Benarsi saree to the bride. This was auctioned by the family and the raised money deposited in the Pakistan defence fund (p.86). The author also notes the lengths to which India would go to prevent foreign agencies intervening in Kashmir often at great loss and inconvenience to itself. In the case of the Salal hydroelectric project on the river allotted to Pakistan in the Indus Waters Treaty, India agreed to significantly reduce the height of the check dam and unilaterally cut short the power generation capability in a bid to avoid seeking international arbitration as per the treaty. Raghavan does not propose any magic formula to settle the issues between the two countries. The implication between the lines is that the serious differences are not to be ironed out in any length of time or in any number of meetings. The issues remain exactly as it were before to create an impression that nothing has changed for the better since 1947. But the author notes that ‘clearly enough has changed to make sure that older solutions will not work’. This also puts former foreign minister Natwar Singh’s prescient remark that ‘the future in Indo-Pakistan relations lie in the past’ in bright focus.
The crucial role played by Pakistan army in shaping public opinion in that country is not fully addressed in this book. The irrelevance of elected representatives in deciding long term policy of Pakistan is notorious but not elaborated here. Instead, Raghavan observes that adulation and exasperation with the army controls Pakistan’s response to India. If the army has overplayed its card, the civilians show good regard to India, but once the army retakes its lost ground in domestic politics, this is reversed. In short, Pakistan is forever waiting for an unguarded moment from India to pounce on her. However, with the rising economic heft of India after 2000, they are finding it slightly difficult to keep pace with India. With financial and military gap further widening between the two countries with each passing year, Pakistan is likely to resort once again to unconventional warfare such as terrorism in future. The book’s narrative ends by 2004. Even though coverage is extended to 2015 by means of an epilogue, it misses the most exciting episodes such as the surgical strikes and the Balakot operation.
The book is highly recommended.
Gregory (Scotland Yard detective): "Is there any other point to which you would wish to draw my attention?"
Holmes: "To the curious incident of the dog in the night-time."
Gregory: "The dog did nothing in the night-time."
Holmes: "That was the curious incident."
The story involves deceit, avarice, crime and punishment. Likewise, India-Pakistan relations also involve most of these attributes and the curious incident is that bilateral relations have not improved a bit in spite of laborious measures undertaken by both sides. As far as India is concerned, Pakistan was always a pain on the western frontier. The nations had fought two large-scale and two small-scale wars over the issue of disputed territory. After realizing the futility of its desire to humble India on the battlefield, Pakistan turned to sponsoring terrorism as state policy to ‘bleed India through a thousand cuts’. The one thing that stands out from this exercise is India’s surprising resilience which always stood one step ahead of its troublesome neighbour. This book is a nice recap of India-Pakistan relations written with the authority of knowledge and experience. T C A Raghavan is a former Indian envoy to Pakistan. He also served in the Pakistan desk in India’s external affairs ministry and as director in the office of India’s foreign minister. Even though no personal anecdotes are mentioned in the book, the author has encapsulated the entire gamut of the relations between the two countries and presented his deductions with a commendable sense of justice and richness with every nuance carefully inserted at the right moment. The typical behaviour of the so called liberal intellectuals in India is to regret the partition that had occurred in 1947 and their wistful longing for Pakistan to come back to India and undo the partition. A useful takeaway from the book is the warning about the irritation such a desire would evoke in Pakistanis. Raghavan enunciates the point that Partition cannot be undone and what is doable is peaceful coexistence at least as non-meddling neighbours if not as friends.
The book narrates several incidents of India-Pakistan relations that vitiated the atmosphere but still are not widely known. Pakistan continues to harbour persons who are fugitives from Indian law such as Dawood Ibrahim, Hafiz Sayeed and Masood Azhar. This one fact amply demonstrates its enmity and hatred to India’s wellbeing. In fact, this is nothing new and was followed right from its existence. The peculiar episode of Bhupat daku is a case in point. Bhupat was a Hindu dacoit from Junagadh in Gujarat who was wanted in the context of 82 murders and several robberies. He escaped to Pakistan to evade Indian law. He was detained there for a year for illegal entry and thereafter it refused to deport him to stand trial for his crimes in India. This was sheer spite as Pakistan had no claim on him. Bhupat then converted to Islam and posed as a freedom fighter from Junagadh who opposed India’s takeover of that state in 1947. Pakistan never extradited him and he died in 2006. This policy is continued in the case of others too. However, with the recently rising trend of ‘unidentified gunmen’ disposing summary justice to some people wanted by India, the continued efficacy of this policy is in doubt.
Even though Afghanistan plays only a marginal role in India-Pakistan strategic reviews, its potential to seriously influence the regional balance is mentioned in the book. This perspective is very rarely seen in books of this genre. The British had unilaterally imposed the Durand Line of border demarcation between undivided India and Afghanistan thereby separating the Pashtun homeland into two. When the British left, the Pashtuns wanted to reunite with Afghanistan but there was no provision to revisit the frontiers on the northwest of Pakistan. Consequently, Afghanistan was the sole member state opposing Pakistan’s entry to the United Nations. Then came the invasion of Kashmir by Pakistani irregular troops in 1947. The UN ordered a ceasefire to which Pakistan proposed a conditional offer. They claimed the invasion to be on security grounds which included preventing India establishing a link for the movement of Pathanistan and to preclude the possibility of a pincer attack by India and Afghanistan. The Soviet occupation beginning in 1979 and the post-Taliban regime were eras in which Pakistan experienced a hostile neighbour on both the east and the west.
The people had to make a hard choice at the time of Partition in the provinces which were bifurcated. Hindus and Sikhs chose India while the Muslims selected Pakistan. The book lists out some Muslims who opted for India even though their native places were within Pakistan and their subsequent actions as it reflected on the relationship between the two countries. Most of these Muslims occupied high positions of power in the bureaucracy. Badruddin Tyabji was one of them working as secretary in the external affairs ministry. He advised Nehru to consider Pakistan as his ‘constituency’ in which he has to get elected. He also suggested treating the government of Pakistan as the opposition and that his reactions to Pakistan should be entirely those of one who was standing for election from there (p.50). In other words, this man was advising Nehru to offer maximum concessions to Pakistan! Nehru fully accepted the counsel was proved by his gifting of 80 per cent of the Indus waters in a treaty also co-signed by the World Bank. A very useful book on the Indus Waters Treaty named 'Indus Divided: India, Pakistan and the River Basin Dispute’ by Daniel Haines was reviewed earlier here. Nehru also agreed to conduct a plebiscite in Kashmir but barely wriggled out of the deal citing US-Pakistan military alliance concluded in the meanwhile. Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, India’s first education minister, asked Afzal Iqbal, a Pakistani diplomat, regarding the military treaty: “Why did you do this? Kashmir was falling on your lap like a ripe fruit” (p.52). The Urdu poetry in India was also a fit case of doubtful loyalty. The author narrates some differences in mutual perception taking the case of Urdu poetry in the aftermath of the 1965 war. Indian Urdu poets deliberately introduced a line of separation between the people and rulers of Pakistan with the implied suggestion that the Pakistani society is not to blame even though the country was at war with India. This demarcation was purely fictional. On the other hand, the Pakistani Urdu poets had no hesitation at all in branding the whole of India – people and rulers alike – as enemy and called for a jihad. Ali Sardar Jafri extolled the Pakistani poet Faiz Ahmed Faiz and argued that Indian poets should have friendship and sympathy for the people of Pakistan. This was when Faiz was actively supporting the Pakistani war machine and vigorously participating in war mushairas (p.92).
Raghavan includes a pointed analysis of the history of mutual dialog between the two neighbours. Nehru was damagingly generous (as far as India is concerned) but Indira Gandhi was curt most of the time, giving Pakistan no quarter. Pakistan was summarily defeated and split apart doing her tenure as prime minister in 1971. But the Janata party regime that followed (1977-79) was not firm enough with Pakistan. The 1971 victory had changed the Pakistani perspective on India’s fighting spirit. Disparaging rebukes like one Pakistani Muslim is equivalent to ten Hindus in the battlefield had given way to cold and rational estimates of military potential of both countries. Mani Sankar Aiyer, who was the Consul General in Karachi during this time, says that as compared to 1971, the prospect of a conflict with India generated not excitement and conviction of victory but fear and apprehension at the certainty of defeat. This, coupled with the change of guard in Pakistan in the form of General Zia ul Haq, ensured friendly terms for the Janata government. As the painful memory of Bangladesh gradually receded to the background, Pakistan again turned belligerent. Unusually meek overtures from India elicited only contemptuous response from the other side of the border. In June 1996 when Prime Minister Deve Gowda and foreign minister Gujral wrote to their counterparts seeking resumption of foreign secretary-level talks, not even a reply was received. The Gujral doctrine postulated India making unilateral and non-reciprocal concessions to its neighbours (p.221). A B Vajpayee at first stole the show with the explosion of nuclear devices, but then yielded to Pakistan even in the face of growing terrorist attacks in the country and hijacking of a commercial airliner. The secret incursion in Kargil fully exposed Pakistani duplicity. It also illustrated the futility of waiting for international diplomatic pressure to mount on Pakistan for effecting a withdrawal of its troops from Kargil. It was the might of the Indian army and its weaponry that drove Pakistani invaders scurrying to their lair. This was also a classic instance of Pakistan misjudging Indian will and ability to fight back. Of course, the author strictly maintains a tone of balance and an air of equanimity in the narrative exercising special care not to exhibit partisanship, but the message readers get is what is mentioned above.
The book shows a peculiar trait of early Indian envoys to Pakistan as of being under the illusion that partition was a temporary affair and they were working in a region not different from their homeland. Their familiarity with Pakistani officials and a shared common language of Urdu was instrumental in creating a superficial and illusive bonhomie. India’s envoy Kewal Singh attended the wedding of Pakistan foreign minister’s son in Rawalpindi while the 1965 war was raging in Kashmir. The reception was hostile, but he still found some excuse to praise the ‘grace and courtesy’ of some who behaved politely with him. Besides, he had gifted a Benarsi saree to the bride. This was auctioned by the family and the raised money deposited in the Pakistan defence fund (p.86). The author also notes the lengths to which India would go to prevent foreign agencies intervening in Kashmir often at great loss and inconvenience to itself. In the case of the Salal hydroelectric project on the river allotted to Pakistan in the Indus Waters Treaty, India agreed to significantly reduce the height of the check dam and unilaterally cut short the power generation capability in a bid to avoid seeking international arbitration as per the treaty. Raghavan does not propose any magic formula to settle the issues between the two countries. The implication between the lines is that the serious differences are not to be ironed out in any length of time or in any number of meetings. The issues remain exactly as it were before to create an impression that nothing has changed for the better since 1947. But the author notes that ‘clearly enough has changed to make sure that older solutions will not work’. This also puts former foreign minister Natwar Singh’s prescient remark that ‘the future in Indo-Pakistan relations lie in the past’ in bright focus.
The crucial role played by Pakistan army in shaping public opinion in that country is not fully addressed in this book. The irrelevance of elected representatives in deciding long term policy of Pakistan is notorious but not elaborated here. Instead, Raghavan observes that adulation and exasperation with the army controls Pakistan’s response to India. If the army has overplayed its card, the civilians show good regard to India, but once the army retakes its lost ground in domestic politics, this is reversed. In short, Pakistan is forever waiting for an unguarded moment from India to pounce on her. However, with the rising economic heft of India after 2000, they are finding it slightly difficult to keep pace with India. With financial and military gap further widening between the two countries with each passing year, Pakistan is likely to resort once again to unconventional warfare such as terrorism in future. The book’s narrative ends by 2004. Even though coverage is extended to 2015 by means of an epilogue, it misses the most exciting episodes such as the surgical strikes and the Balakot operation.
The book is highly recommended.
March 3, 2018
A good narrative of the Iindia-Pakistan equation seen more from a diplomatic angle. It helps sets the context and gives one a perspective of how we have ended up here. The more recent history have been slightly rushed through and not much is said on the post 2000 era. I also like how he has shown the Pakistani reactions to the major incidents.
Do note that it is more of a narrative rather than an analysis of the situation
Do note that it is more of a narrative rather than an analysis of the situation
June 13, 2018
"...neither the extent of goodwill nor the extent of hostility in each country for the other can be understated..."
Ambassador TCA Raghavan evokes a sense of hope as well as despair as he presents a wide-ranging history of India-Pakistan relations. He clearly presents events and narratives, Indian and Pakistani, as he navigates the unpredictable turmoils, emotions, drama, and politics of our unfulfilled coexistence.
Ambassador TCA Raghavan evokes a sense of hope as well as despair as he presents a wide-ranging history of India-Pakistan relations. He clearly presents events and narratives, Indian and Pakistani, as he navigates the unpredictable turmoils, emotions, drama, and politics of our unfulfilled coexistence.
October 1, 2020
The disappointment is that it couldn't cover new changes in approach with Pakistan like the Balakot attack calling out the Nuclear bluff,new red lines with Separatist groups of JK & most importantly the August 5 decision of abrogating Article 370.Hope the next edition covers all these crucial changes in the expanded chapter for 2009-2019!
December 24, 2017
Refreshing
Very readable summary of the India Pakistan narrative since 47. Not too heavy either. I finished the book in 4 days.
Very readable summary of the India Pakistan narrative since 47. Not too heavy either. I finished the book in 4 days.
January 11, 2020
Indians, Pakistanis, and the curious connections between them
A review of TCA Raghavan’s ‘The People Next Door: The Curious History of India’s Relations with Pakistan’
As TCA Raghavan observes right upfront, “books on different aspects of India—Pakistan relations will easily fill a library”. For publishers and readers alike, Pakistan is the gift that keeps on giving. The corollary is that the law of diminishing marginal utility applies — the knowledge gained from reading each additional book on Pakistan keeps declining.
It is precisely with these thoughts that I began reading The People Next Door. But by stringing together stories of lesser-known and intriguing individuals, Raghavan skilfully avoids all the pitfalls associated with books on Pakistan. As he says, this is neither a ‘history’ book nor a ‘policy’ book. Rather, any reader with even a cursory interest in India—Pakistan relations will find the book rewarding.
The structure of the book is simple. Raghavan tracks India-Pakistan relations in chronological order from independence to 2015. But he does so selectively, focusing the narrative on the outliers to construct a ‘curious history’ of the tumultuous relationship.
The atypical individuals
The contrarian examples of individuals who swam against the tide are the highpoints of the book. The stories of Azim Husain and Mohammad Yunus, who ditched Pakistan for India, and then went on to serve in the Indian Foreign Service with acclaim are extremely interesting. My personal favourite is the story of how the ‘genuine sensationalist’ Kanhaiya Lal Gauba — hailing from a prominent family in Lahore — became Khurshid Latif Gauba in 1933, and eventually chose to stay in Bombay over Lahore only because of his differences with the Muslim League. Outlook has an excerpt from the book based on these three stories, which is not to be missed.
The case of Bhupat Daku’s extradition is intriguing too, especially for its parallels with the case of Dawood Ibrahim. The story of the Chakma Raja, Tridiv Roy, a practising Buddhist who chose Pakistan over Bangladesh in 1971 is another oddity that finds mention in the book.
The geographic anomalies
Beyond the people, curiosities abound even in the places they occupy. For instance, the author talks briefly about Mewat and Malerkotla, two Muslim majority places in India that managed to avoid the ethnic cleansing which swept undivided Punjab during and after the Partition.
The question of how the Radcliffe Line was drawn around Gurdaspur is equally interesting, and not for strategic reasons alone. Qadian, the headquarters of the Ahmadiyas, fell in this district. So, Pakistan’s tenuous claim over this area rested on the implication that the Ahmadiyas were Muslims too. Such an implication would amount to blasphemy in Pakistan today.
Also, it was only through the book that I came to know of the fact that ‘some maps of Pakistan to this day show Junagadh as a part of it and to many Pakistanis it was a legal accession undone by brute use of military force by India’.
Cases of striking group interactions
A few instances in the book remind us how even through the worst of times, a few interactions between governments and groups continued unabated. For example: ‘In April 1955, matches were held in East and West Punjab between the hockey teams of respective police forces of the two countries and the Indian deputy high commission in Lahore recounts issuing 54,000 short duration visas to enable travel to Jullundur and Amritsar to see the games.’ Remember, this was just eight years after the horrors of the partition!
Also in 1955, the Chief Guest for India’s Republic Day celebrations was Malik Ghulam Muhammad, Governor-General of Pakistan.
The stories about East and West Bengal governments in the years immediately after independence are striking too. Both sides wanted to avoid the recurrence of a Punjab-like situation by stemming the refugee flows of minorities across the border. The two PMs eventually signed an agreement in 1950, demonstrating that ‘both sides tacitly seemed to agree that no matter how important or divisive the issue of the day maybe, no single aspect should so dominate relations that everything else became subject to its satisfactory conclusion.’
Discordance at the international stage
The interactions between Pakistan and India at the international stage has no such hope-inducing oddities. While India and Pakistan indulged in some easily avoidable oneupmanship at the UN General Assembly earlier in 2017, The People Next Door reminds us that such instances, unfortunately, have a long history. As far back as 1975, India and Pakistan were involved in a bitter fight over a UN Security Council non-permanent member seat that hijacked the proceedings of the sessions, causing embarrassment to both States. India’s Foreign Secretary Kewal Singh later rued in these words: ‘both the countries became the laughing stock of the rest of the world setting unedifying examples of bickering’.
A few lessons…
Based on my reading of the book, I could extract these lessons.
First, India—Pakistan relations seem to be an archetypical example of a class of public policy problems known as ‘wicked’ problems. One of the major characteristics of such problems is that there is no definitive formulation of a wicked problem, i.e. even the definition and scope of the problem is contested. This wicked nature becomes apparent when one reads the book: Pakistani and Indian establishments draw almost diametrically opposite learnings from all major events in their joint histories. These lines from the book sum the wicked problem brilliantly.
This is both the true weight of history and also how the present affects and changes the past: older issues and disputes transform and mutate themselves to acquire new characteristics and often an even sharper intensity. There are, therefore, no ‘pure’ legacy issues. What appears seemingly old is, in fact, also quite new. The entire India–Pakistan portfolio would fall in this category — from Kashmir to river waters, from terrorism to trade
Second, one realises that there has been no shortfall of grand gestures from the political leadership of both sides. But every such occasion has proved to be unsuccessful. This tells us that there is a mediating variable which makes it impossible for such grand efforts to succeed. In my assessment, this variable is the Pakistani military-jihadi complex (MJC). In our formulation:
Pakistan is not one geopolitical entity, but two: the putative state (represented currently by a civilian government), and the military—jihadi complex that has captured the commanding heights of power. The inability to understand this duality of Pakistan has led to misplaced expectations, confounding outcomes and failed policies by states and international governments alike.
A deep-seated antagonism towards India is essential to the survival and the dominance of the MJC. So, all elements of MJC propagate the view that India and Pakistan are locked in a zero-sum game. One can succeed only to the detriment of the other. Given its irreconcilable nature, it seems that peace between Indians and Pakistanis is contingent on a significant reduction in power of the MJC in the eyes of Pakistanis themselves.
Finally..
The author is a historian by training and it shows — the book has excellent references that I hadn’t heard of before. I strongly recommend this book to any Indian interested in appreciating the the intricacies of the India—Pakistan relationship. I also hope that the book gets translated into many more Indian languages. In today’s mahaul, stories of India and Pakistan acrimony are a hit; the stories of Indians and Pakistanis are much less so. This book helps address this imbalance.
A review of TCA Raghavan’s ‘The People Next Door: The Curious History of India’s Relations with Pakistan’
As TCA Raghavan observes right upfront, “books on different aspects of India—Pakistan relations will easily fill a library”. For publishers and readers alike, Pakistan is the gift that keeps on giving. The corollary is that the law of diminishing marginal utility applies — the knowledge gained from reading each additional book on Pakistan keeps declining.
It is precisely with these thoughts that I began reading The People Next Door. But by stringing together stories of lesser-known and intriguing individuals, Raghavan skilfully avoids all the pitfalls associated with books on Pakistan. As he says, this is neither a ‘history’ book nor a ‘policy’ book. Rather, any reader with even a cursory interest in India—Pakistan relations will find the book rewarding.
The structure of the book is simple. Raghavan tracks India-Pakistan relations in chronological order from independence to 2015. But he does so selectively, focusing the narrative on the outliers to construct a ‘curious history’ of the tumultuous relationship.
The atypical individuals
The contrarian examples of individuals who swam against the tide are the highpoints of the book. The stories of Azim Husain and Mohammad Yunus, who ditched Pakistan for India, and then went on to serve in the Indian Foreign Service with acclaim are extremely interesting. My personal favourite is the story of how the ‘genuine sensationalist’ Kanhaiya Lal Gauba — hailing from a prominent family in Lahore — became Khurshid Latif Gauba in 1933, and eventually chose to stay in Bombay over Lahore only because of his differences with the Muslim League. Outlook has an excerpt from the book based on these three stories, which is not to be missed.
The case of Bhupat Daku’s extradition is intriguing too, especially for its parallels with the case of Dawood Ibrahim. The story of the Chakma Raja, Tridiv Roy, a practising Buddhist who chose Pakistan over Bangladesh in 1971 is another oddity that finds mention in the book.
The geographic anomalies
Beyond the people, curiosities abound even in the places they occupy. For instance, the author talks briefly about Mewat and Malerkotla, two Muslim majority places in India that managed to avoid the ethnic cleansing which swept undivided Punjab during and after the Partition.
The question of how the Radcliffe Line was drawn around Gurdaspur is equally interesting, and not for strategic reasons alone. Qadian, the headquarters of the Ahmadiyas, fell in this district. So, Pakistan’s tenuous claim over this area rested on the implication that the Ahmadiyas were Muslims too. Such an implication would amount to blasphemy in Pakistan today.
Also, it was only through the book that I came to know of the fact that ‘some maps of Pakistan to this day show Junagadh as a part of it and to many Pakistanis it was a legal accession undone by brute use of military force by India’.
Cases of striking group interactions
A few instances in the book remind us how even through the worst of times, a few interactions between governments and groups continued unabated. For example: ‘In April 1955, matches were held in East and West Punjab between the hockey teams of respective police forces of the two countries and the Indian deputy high commission in Lahore recounts issuing 54,000 short duration visas to enable travel to Jullundur and Amritsar to see the games.’ Remember, this was just eight years after the horrors of the partition!
Also in 1955, the Chief Guest for India’s Republic Day celebrations was Malik Ghulam Muhammad, Governor-General of Pakistan.
The stories about East and West Bengal governments in the years immediately after independence are striking too. Both sides wanted to avoid the recurrence of a Punjab-like situation by stemming the refugee flows of minorities across the border. The two PMs eventually signed an agreement in 1950, demonstrating that ‘both sides tacitly seemed to agree that no matter how important or divisive the issue of the day maybe, no single aspect should so dominate relations that everything else became subject to its satisfactory conclusion.’
Discordance at the international stage
The interactions between Pakistan and India at the international stage has no such hope-inducing oddities. While India and Pakistan indulged in some easily avoidable oneupmanship at the UN General Assembly earlier in 2017, The People Next Door reminds us that such instances, unfortunately, have a long history. As far back as 1975, India and Pakistan were involved in a bitter fight over a UN Security Council non-permanent member seat that hijacked the proceedings of the sessions, causing embarrassment to both States. India’s Foreign Secretary Kewal Singh later rued in these words: ‘both the countries became the laughing stock of the rest of the world setting unedifying examples of bickering’.
A few lessons…
Based on my reading of the book, I could extract these lessons.
First, India—Pakistan relations seem to be an archetypical example of a class of public policy problems known as ‘wicked’ problems. One of the major characteristics of such problems is that there is no definitive formulation of a wicked problem, i.e. even the definition and scope of the problem is contested. This wicked nature becomes apparent when one reads the book: Pakistani and Indian establishments draw almost diametrically opposite learnings from all major events in their joint histories. These lines from the book sum the wicked problem brilliantly.
This is both the true weight of history and also how the present affects and changes the past: older issues and disputes transform and mutate themselves to acquire new characteristics and often an even sharper intensity. There are, therefore, no ‘pure’ legacy issues. What appears seemingly old is, in fact, also quite new. The entire India–Pakistan portfolio would fall in this category — from Kashmir to river waters, from terrorism to trade
Second, one realises that there has been no shortfall of grand gestures from the political leadership of both sides. But every such occasion has proved to be unsuccessful. This tells us that there is a mediating variable which makes it impossible for such grand efforts to succeed. In my assessment, this variable is the Pakistani military-jihadi complex (MJC). In our formulation:
Pakistan is not one geopolitical entity, but two: the putative state (represented currently by a civilian government), and the military—jihadi complex that has captured the commanding heights of power. The inability to understand this duality of Pakistan has led to misplaced expectations, confounding outcomes and failed policies by states and international governments alike.
A deep-seated antagonism towards India is essential to the survival and the dominance of the MJC. So, all elements of MJC propagate the view that India and Pakistan are locked in a zero-sum game. One can succeed only to the detriment of the other. Given its irreconcilable nature, it seems that peace between Indians and Pakistanis is contingent on a significant reduction in power of the MJC in the eyes of Pakistanis themselves.
Finally..
The author is a historian by training and it shows — the book has excellent references that I hadn’t heard of before. I strongly recommend this book to any Indian interested in appreciating the the intricacies of the India—Pakistan relationship. I also hope that the book gets translated into many more Indian languages. In today’s mahaul, stories of India and Pakistan acrimony are a hit; the stories of Indians and Pakistanis are much less so. This book helps address this imbalance.
November 30, 2019
A well balanced history of India Pakistan relationship since the dawn of Independence. The author tries to represent an unbiased perspective of the turbulence relationship and the sort of plausible causes of suspicion on both sides towards each other. Sadly, why the army or ISI had to always foment trouble, when often the leadership irrespective of who is in power tried to boost the relationship is something perhaps will always remain a mystery, which to an extent author also acknowledges. Getting the insights and excerpts of the people actually involved in the dealings which the author had access to being a diplomat was something a memorable experience to read.
April 28, 2023
Somebody who is curious about South Asia, especially India Pakistan relationships and that too from somebody who is an Indian Diplomat, as has spent several years in Pakistan : is a powerhouse of realistic analysis and grounded factual review.
The book identifies the narrative and events between India Pakistan and people to people relationships have evolved, therewith.
The books also highlights about the common people i.e. 1947 artition divided families, peace doves on both sides, war mongers, NGO's, associations working towards building people to people connect.
A must read for a Uniqe and Thorough Overview of Peoples Opinion
SAARC Today
The book identifies the narrative and events between India Pakistan and people to people relationships have evolved, therewith.
The books also highlights about the common people i.e. 1947 artition divided families, peace doves on both sides, war mongers, NGO's, associations working towards building people to people connect.
A must read for a Uniqe and Thorough Overview of Peoples Opinion
SAARC Today
February 28, 2022
I think this book maybe expected me to know a bit more India/Pakistan history than I do but it was still an interesting read.
March 22, 2022
I definitely didn’t get as much out of it as if I knew more background, I enjoyed his focus on the overall mood. It was an interesting lens to view a long and complicated conflict through.
August 14, 2022
A good read. Gives a good insight into diplomatic efforts in Indo-Pak relations over the years.
March 16, 2024
READ THE REVIEW HERE: https://adarshbadri.me/book-review/ra...
January 16, 2025
Eminently readable - a story well known, but re-told so well.
June 17, 2018
A civil servant's perspective on how relations go topsy turvy and the baggage of history that both the states are unable to let go of in their dealings with each other. Anger, humiliation, schadenfreude and a host of emotions run up and down and the author tries to be as balanced as possible in giving a clear reading of what constitutes India-Pakistan relations.
Read
October 2, 2018(Didn't finish)
Displaying 1 - 19 of 19 reviews